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7 Surviving through transplantation




Labour Day celebrations were stormy at the headquarters of Migros in 1994.1
The streets of Kadiko¨y, a middle-class mixed residential and office neigh-
bourhood across the Bosporus from the prestige business district of Istanbul,
were blocked with heavy traffic as demonstrators indulged in the routine
clashes with police. Reporters on the scene became more enraged at the
anarchistic turn of demonstrators, who uprooted flowers in the small parks
they passed. The pillage of stores and other capitalist symbols was unusual,
and many commentators suggested that this was a reaction to liberalisation
and conspicuous consumption. Bad news for retailers such as Migros-Tu¨rk.
They had just began to develop large-scale retailing and had to be sensitive to
social tension, which, if combined with a downturn in the economic cycle,
could have halted business growth altogether.
Despite his depressed mood and annoyance with the riot police, who had
taken over the entire top floor and roof of his building in order to observe the
demonstrators, the general manager, Bu¨lent O¨zaydinli, was still excited about
the future of his company. Despite his worries about social, economic and
political disruptions, he was optimistic, and one of his remarks was prescient
about Turkey’s relations with Europe: ‘With this retail transformation,
Turkey is already in Europe even without EU membership.’
Eleven years later the new Migros-Tu¨rk headquarters was strategically
located in a wealthy satellite town of Istanbul with abundant green areas and
parks. The new general manager, Aziz Bulgu, was a veteran of the aggressive
move into the Russian market that had helped to build the company’s brand as
‘Ramstore’ in many Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries.2
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Bulgu was more concerned about the intensified competition from foreign
retailers than social unrest or political instability. Britain’s Tesco had newly
entered the Turkish market and, despite their earlier entry, Metro and
Carrefour were just gaining confidence and beginning to expand their opera-
tions. Despite these global competitors, Migros-Tu¨rk was still the biggest and
most widely spread retailer in the country, with a large stake in Russia and
central Asia.
Introduction
In describing the development of the British department store Marks and
Spencer, Gary Davies (1999) argues that the success of the company has been
largely through organic growth and the managed evolution of a retail format
that has changed slowly over the last 100 years. Such slowmanaged evolution,
the author claims, can be explained by theories of the ‘wheel of retailing’
and the ‘retail accordion’. In contrast, the case of Migros-Tu¨rk does not
support these theories and the biological metaphors appropriate for it are not
evolutionary. Even if we can trace cyclical patterns in other Turkish retail
institutions, Migros’s history is one of many temporal and spatial disconti-
nuities from its origins in Switzerland to its domestication as part of the Koc¸
conglomerate of Turkey. Studying the recent history of Migros can be better
understood within the context of business transplants, technology and busi-
ness transfers, which are inadequately understood and conceptualised in
retail change theories. In this chapter 1 show that business change occurred
through experiments of transplantation and cloning that ruptured the mar-
ket with the introduction of alien retail institutions that had not evolved in
the Turkish market. The move from Swiss Migros to Migros-Tu¨rk exempli-
fies a development from transplantation to an eventual successful hybrid
existence through institutional and organisational changes in large-scale
retailing.
In this chapter 1 show how the successful growth of Migros-Tu¨rk illus-
trates uneven organisational development interrupted by a fractured deploy-
ment of retail technologies. The case demonstrates the role of agency in
shaping organisational destiny in relation to the big waves of changes taking
place in Turkish society and the economy. Despite the availability of mostly
US and European retail technologies and management techniques, the
uneven institutional diffusion of retail business models supports the view
common among sceptics of global standardisation. Varying economic
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growth and the diversity of business practices indicate that homogenisation
or global standardisation is not an inevitable result of the availability of
technology. Instead, both the transfer process and the institutionalisation of
technology and business models are highly unpredictable and discontinuous
across sectors and economic spheres. This process is often affected deeply by
the response of agents and institutions to changing environmental circum-
stances (i.e. market competition, regulation and social development). I
demonstrate here that, due to these complexities, the organisational response
is highly heterogeneous in the application of new business techniques and
technology transfer.
Migros-Tu¨rk is analysed within this conceptual framework, showing how
its success was engraved by its hybridisation, which eventually not only
differed from its original Swiss company’s business model but also set it
apart from its domestic rivals. First, the Migros-Tu¨rk phenomenon is
explored in terms of its business behaviour, organisational capacity and
change agents. Second, the scene is set for the trajectory of the company
within the societal and environmental changes in Turkey that have changed
the business landscape dramatically from mostly state-controlled to a liberal
market economy over the past three decades.
The search by the Istanbul municipal authorities for technical assistance in
establishing a new food distribution agency resulted in the first internation-
ally owned retail chain to enter the Turkish market. Thus, in 1954, the Swiss-
owned cooperative Migros introduced its retail technology and know-how.
First, mobile retailing began with trucks in order to provide an effective food
service for Istanbul residents. Gradually, Migros introduced small stores for
middle-class consumers. Stringent import substitution policies and the resul-
tant scarcity of goods and services forced the Swiss co-operative to sell its
business to one of the Turkish state-owned banks in 1974, a period of political
turmoil in the country. This brought growth to a halt for the organisation,
until it began to restructure itself some twenty years later. The change from a
partly foreign-owned co-operative to Turkey’s first national retailer accom-
panied deep changes in the market economy, society and retail technology.
The survival of Migros-Tu¨rk is the result of its organisational capability as an
institution, riding high on waves of retail change cycles in response to
Europeanisation, deregulation and privatisation. As much as the institutional
capabilities and opportunities created by environmental and technological
changes, the role of key actors, such as the pioneering manager Bu¨lent
O¨zaydinli, its synergies with real estate developers and contractors, the
strength of the Koc¸ family conglomerate and the determination of a young
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and very ambitious group ofmiddlemanagers behind the business havemade
Migros a far more successful retailer than its domestic rivals such as Gima and
Tansas¸.
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section provides a
general overview of retail change theories and offers a critical perspective
on how a multiplicity of theories can be applied to business cases. It also
highlights the peculiarities of this sort of single case study approach vis-a`-vis
aggregate sectoral studies. The second section introduces the early start of
Migros within the context of cooperative establishments and their consider-
able importance in food distribution and retailing in the 1950s. An interim
period of scarcity and turbulence is described in the third section, followed by
an analysis of the cloning of Migros-Tu¨rk, based on European retailing, at a
time of deregulation and liberalisation in the Turkish economy. The follow-
ing section illustrates how the hybridisation of local know-how with retail
technology characterised the successful internationalisation of the company.
The conclusion argues that the company’s success lies in its survival in a
volatile environment. Its business change through the transplantation and
cloning of foreign commercial technology has now produced a sustainable
hybrid capable of developing its own retail technology and business structure.
Retail change and technology transfer
The essential elements of retail change theories focus on the dynamic inter-
action between retail forms (institutions) and their competition (markets).
Businesses react to market forces to survive, while competition pushes retail-
ers to devise an unending stream of new retail forms. In these approaches,
institutions are very loosely defined, and range from individual firms or
groups of firms to looser forms of organisation (chain stores, cooperatives,
etc.) and national retail systems. For the most part, however, they refer to
distinctive structures or techniques, such as a convenience stores, department
stores, supermarkets, variety stores, shopping centres, discount stores, hyper-
markets, etc.
Stephen Brown (1987) offers the most comprehensive account of retail
change theories (see, for example, Roth and Klein, 1993, for ecological
theories and Evans, Barnes and Schlacter, 1993, and Appel, 1972, for institu-
tional evolution). First, environmental theory argues that changes in retailing
are a function of developments in the socio-economic environment; such
studies include cases and ecological and natural selection approaches.
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Second, the cyclical theory suggests that change takes place in a rhythmic
fashion and is characterised by the recurrence of earlier trends, such as the
‘wheel of retailing’ and retail life cycles. Third, conflict theory focuses on
inter-institutional conflict, which occurs when new forms of retailing emerge,
develop and disrupt traditional trade practices.
In studying Migros-Tu¨rk we make two important distinctions. First, theo-
retical generalisations on the evolution of retail forms offer limited scope for
the research of an individual company. Second, we are studying a retailer in a
developing economy in which mature Western retail forms have been trans-
planted and did not evolve in the dynamic context of markets and institutions.
Thus, although the merits of environmentalist and ecological theoretical per-
spectives are apparent, their explanatory power is weak when it comes to the
study of organisational survival as well as discontinuity. While most modern
retail technologies and institutions enter emerging economies through foreign
direct investment or technology transfer, there is little informed research on
how domestic organisations use and reproduce these technologies.
Marketing scientists long ago suggested a direct relationship between
economic development and retail institutions. The sophistication of retailing
and distribution channels from production to consumption is regarded as a
function of economic development. More levels of distribution and retail
outlets are associated with higher economic development (Samiee, 1993;
Hollander, 1986; Savitt, 1982). In many developing economies, the problem
of scarcity and the mismatch between high urban demand and poor food
supply and distribution have been commonly observed phenomena (Currie,
1968). On account of the low incomes, cultural differences in consumption
habits and state-imposed price caps and other market distortions, many
researchers questioned the merits of retail technology transfer to developing
countries. Research in the 1980s concluded that Western retail techniques
were not easily transferable or exportable (Yavas¸, Kaynak and Borak, 1981;
Goldman, 1982; Savitt, 1990). For example, Ronald Savitt (1990) has ques-
tioned whether economic development can be triggered by simply importing
retail technology. Erdener Kaynak (1982, 1986) has emphasised the role of
efficient marketing and distribution channels in food distribution and eco-
nomic development. Ronan Paddison, Allan Findlay and John Dawson
(1990) have linked the slow modernisation of retailing to peculiar supply
and demand conditions in developing countries.
The success of technology transfer in this sector is highly dependent upon
the customer profile and receptivity. Market penetration by supermarkets
and hypermarkets is conditional on external factors such as customer
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mobility, household income and consumption habits. Similarly, supporting
businesses in production, service and distribution are crucial for the success
of large-scale retailing. Retailers in developing countries are often charac-
terised by a large number of small, independent, family-run shops and
wholesalers (Kaynak, 1982). Capital accumulation is modest and businesses
lack knowledge of modern marketing techniques. Food distribution channels
are described as long and household production widespread among the rural
households and poor urban residents (Samiee, 1993). Paddison, Findlay and
Dawson (1990) argue that the urban retailing system in developing countries
appears to be chaotic by comparison with the spatial segregation and hier-
archical ordering of developed economies. Periodic marketing, street selling,
hawking and the informal sector not only constitute an important segment of
the retail trade in these countries but also offer employment opportunities.
Just as Developing countries themselves display marked diversity and com-
plexity, however, so does retailing in these countries. Their level of indus-
trialisation, economic growth and size of population vary greatly, too. The
emergence of mass markets across the world’s big cities is changing retail
landscapes, as well as consumption and shopping habits.
In the late 1980s somemarketing scientist began to argue that urban people
in developed and developing countries were converging on similar consump-
tion patterns (Kaynak, 1986). Nonetheless, most Third World literature
remained suspicious about the effects of the transfer of new retail outlets
and technologies, focusing rightly on economic development and govern-
ment control as indicating an underdeveloped retail and wholesale market in
many developing economies. What has changed the retail sector of develop-
ing economies dramatically since the 1980s, however, has been global trade
liberalisation and the internationalisation of large US and European retailers.
Some have argued that government polices have been more influential in
shaping the retail business in developing countries than market competition
(Hollander and Boddewyn, 1974). Nevertheless, it remains the case that the
diffusion ofmanyWestern products into domestic wholesale chains through-
out the 1970s and 1980s altered distribution networks and tastes in develop-
ing countries long before supermarkets entered (Tokatli and Eldener, 2002).
The impact of media and internet technologies has also been substantial in
opening up a new consumer age. Today many modern retail forms such as
supermarkets and shopping malls are available in cities in the developing
world, and these have profound effects on consumer behaviour, retail and
distribution channels, and food production and marketing. The degree
of market penetration by retail technology is still low, but for many
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middle-income developing countries supermarkets, hypermarkets and shop-
ping malls are common features of the urban landscape.
Retail technology includes not just equipment and software but also the
organisational moulding of these technologies through their use in design,
store formats and marketing tools. It also involves knowledgeable participation
on the part of shoppers. The use of computer technology in the retail industry
began in the 1970s and 1980s for non-administrative tasks. The introduction of
bar code readers and scanners providedmajor cost saving and efficiency gains to
retailers (Walsh, 1993). Information technologies (IT) began to shape all aspects
of retailing, from supply chain management to customer relationship manage-
ment, in the 1980s. Electronic point of sale (EPOS)3 and electronic data inter-
change (EDI) technologies are now widely used by retailers around the world
(Lynch, 1990; Al-Sudairy and Tang, 2000). These technologies speed up the
exchange of data and payment, and they enhance the spread of massive retail
operations into different geographical locations. They also optimise delivery and
logistics among suppliers, warehouses and retail outlets. Recent developments in
information technologies have rationalised distribution channels, and extend
the power of large-scale retailing vis-a`-vis manufacturers and suppliers globally
(Ducatel and Biomley, 1990). New IT tools, such as internet shopping, wireless
scanning, new inventory management techniques, hand-held computers and
automatic computer reordering, are being experimented with by global retailers.
These enabling technologies, although developed mostly in the United States,
have beenwidely available to retailers worldwide. AsChandler (2005) has argued,
however, importing a tool is not a transfer of technology in itself; rather, how that
tool is used in an organisation and how it is subject to innovation mark an
integrated learning base for an organisation. Indeed, as we illustrate in this case
study, technology diffusion in modern retailing has been uneven and often
shaped by institutional players and societal changes. The trajectory of Migros-
Tu¨rk, Turkey’s leading domestic and international retailer, can best be under-
stood as part of the complex interplay between an engineered existence through
the periodic upgrading of retail technology and broader institutional and
environmental changes. In the following section we examine how Migros-Tu¨rk
evolved as an organisation and how it responded to its changing environment.
The rise of cooperatives and the first transplantation of Migros
Migros-Tu¨rk originated in cooperative movements in Europe. Although
consumer cooperatives never played a significant role in US retailing and
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distribution, they have played an important role in many western European
countries. They were among the leaders in introducing self-service retailing to
the European food trades, and by 1960 cooperatives accounted for one-tenth
of all retail sales in Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and
Denmark (Jefferys and Knee, 1962). In the 1950s cooperative organisations
expressed a sense of responsibility for the promotion of counterpart institu-
tions in developing nations. Many of the advocates considered cooperatives
an avenue for the social, as well as economic, advancement of people whose
material resources were limited. Moreover, some proponents believed that
cooperative activity closely resembled the ties of tribal or village life, and thus
was particularly suitable to conditions in many poor countries (Hollander,
1970). As pointed out by Reed Moyer and Stanley Hollander (1968), devel-
oping country policy-makers who associated commercial trade with colonial
powers or with unpopular ethnic minority groups felt a strong preference for
cooperative enterprise.
Food distribution cooperatives were first introduced in Turkey in 1913,
during the Balkan Wars, in order to cope with price increases and shortages.
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire the republican government aimed
to fill market gaps in food processing and established state-run enterprises in
meat, sugar and flour production. Although Turkey did not take part in the
Second World War, its economy was severely affected. During the war the
government introduced the National Protection Law, which aimed to control
food prices and regulated the rationing of sugar, flour and bread. The state
had an almost complete monopoly in modern foodstuffs processing and
distribution, including staples such as fish, meat, milk, sugar, and tea. All
the same, there were severe food shortages and distribution problems (S¸amli,
1964). Istanbul was a rapidly growing city and suffered the most. The news-
papers at that time were reporting shortages of sugar and coffee every day,
along with unpredictable price increases. Middle-class urbanites sought their
food supplies from bazaars and small shops. The food handling standards
were poor, with no labelling, no proper packaging and no reliable measure-
ments. Food was commonly wrapped in newspapers, and customers used
their own shopping bags. In order to regulate food distribution and prevent
black markets from growing, the first generation of supermarkets were
initiated by municipalities, state companies and cooperatives in order to
provide affordable and secure food delivery.
In the post-war period the municipality of Istanbul was determined to
regulate foodstuffs retailing in the city and sent an expert, Ferruh Ilter, to the
United States to learn about new retail practices. During this period Ilter
188 Gu¨l Berna O¨zcan
//FS2/CUP/3-PAGINATION/MRM/2-PROOFS/3B2/9780521861519C07.3D 189 [181–206] 19.9.2007 9:39PM
learnt about Swiss Migros, and later he visited Switzerland. Upon his return
he was appointed head of the economy division of the municipality, with
responsibility for food pricing and distribution in the city. He quickly
recognised the need for know-how in modern retailing in the city, and
persuaded the mayor, the governor and the finance minister to support his
idea of inviting the founder of Swiss Migros, Gottlieb Duttweiler, to bring
that company’s retail technology to Istanbul. He sent a formal invitation
letter to Duttweiler in October 1953 (Oluc¸, 1956).
Gottlieb Duttweiler had begun food retailing in 1925, at the age of sixteen,
and he emigrated to Brazil during World War I. Upon his return to
Switzerland he acquired five old Ford trucks and began mobile retailing.
His low prices quickly made him unpopular among established retailers.
Although there were many difficulties, particularly during the early years,
whenDuttweiler was threatened with imprisonment because of his deviations
from the price control laws, the organisation flourished throughout
Switzerland. Migros expanded its business into food production, printing
and even the film industry. By 1954 Migros had 289 retail stores (including
ten supermarkets) and seventy trucks, nine butcher’s shops and three cloth-
ing stores (Oluc¸, 1956).
The invitation to Istanbul and the municipality’s commitments were
serious. A group of experts from Swiss Migros accompanied the deputy
manager, H. Hochstrasser, to Istanbul in January 1954. With the aim of
providing ‘cheap foodstuffs’, the introduction of the Migros model was
strongly supported by the municipality and the government. Following
negotiations, the limited liability company Migros-Tu¨rk was established
with the participation of nineteen shareholders, including Duttweiler and
Hochstrasser, with TL500,000 total capital – equivalent to only a few thou-
sand US dollars. As this was too small an amount to introduce theMigros way
of retailing, the government supported the deal with a generous TL5 million
credit scheme from the state-controlled Ziraat and Yapi Kredi Banks. Thus,
the transplantation began. Swiss Migros sent the first general manager, Karl
Ketterer, to Istanbul and eight Turkish civil servants went to Switzerland to be
trained in accounting, packaging technologies, management and sales.
Turkey had no automobile industry, so sixty trucks had to be imported
from the United Kingdom. A warehouse was opened in Emino¨nu¨ food
market, where food was classified, weighed and packaged. A customised
packaging machine was imported for this purpose. The arrival of the first
twenty trucks, which paraded through the city, was greeted by excited crowds
and accompanied by motorcycle policemen. The opening ceremony turned
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into a state celebration, with the participation of many Member of
Parliaments and ministers, along with the mayor and governor of Istanbul,
on 30 September 1955. Trucks began operation on fixed neighbourhood
routes and leaflets were delivered to residents about the time of truck delivery
stops. This was a new concept of shopping time, and some contemporaries
pointed out that observing clock time was not a common phenomenon
for housewives; many households did not pay attention to, or even have,
clocks at all!
At first, the trucks sold just twenty-nine categories of foodstuffs, totalling
fifty items, and truck drivers used telephones to communicate their supply
needs. The business was a great success, however. During the first few days the
trucks were emptied by their fourth or fifth stop. In December 1957 the first
store (with a total floor space of 114 sq.m.) was opened in Balikpazari,
Istanbul; reports indicate that finding building material and store furniture
was a real problem at the time. Migros-Tu¨rk’s sales increased and the number
of stores reached eight by 1959, despite rising inflation, high national debt
and generally poor economic management by the ruling Democrat Party.
Food shortages, high prices and the black market continued to be a problem
for many in Istanbul. The company introduced roadside stands in the late
1950s, and by 1959 it had sixty trucks, eleven roadside stands and 327
employees. During this period the economy struggled, with a severe shortage
of currency (inflation had risen to 90 per cent in 1958) and heavy foreign
borrowing fuelled by clumsy populist politics, leading to a deep financial
crisis. This, combined with the fears of traditionalist revivalism, triggered a
military coup in 1960.
Despite the outward appearance of a successful transplantation, there were
severe problems for the new company. First, Migros-Tu¨rk was encountering
heavy financial losses. The government’s price control of food products was
the main concern of the Swiss partners and they deeply resented having to
work in such an environment. Second, the company encountered consider-
able difficulty in securing spare parts and replacement units for trucks,
because of import and foreign exchange controls. Truck maintenance costs
tended to be high relative to sales volume. In addition, importing spare parts
for trucks and other equipment took a long time and involved cumbersome
bureaucratic procedures. A shipment of used trucks donated by the Swiss
partners to replace badly deteriorated and obsolete units in the Turkish fleet
was delayed for months over negotiations with the authorities about the
appropriate custom duties. These difficulties all hindered the business.
Third, the shortage of skilled people and a high turnover of sales assistants
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also became a problem as the business grew. Finally, the bad roads, harsh
winters and hot summers made truck operations and food delivery difficult.
Swiss Migros expressed its intention to leave and tried to negotiate a
cooperative deal to sell shares to individuals, but neither the government
nor the municipality had schemes in place that could implement this. Indeed,
Swiss Migros began to think that it was expected to play a purely technical,
advisory and marginal role. The venture reached the point of collapse by the
end of the 1950s.
The government was determined to save Migros-Tu¨rk from collapse and
bankruptcy, however. Negotiations continued and repeated assurances were
given to the Swiss partners to persuade them to stay. Eventually they accepted
a new deal. The company was recapitalised with TL9 million following the
coup and Swiss Migros took a controlling share of 51 per cent in partnership
with municipal and state organisations, including Istanbul municipality,
the State Enterprise for Meat and Fishery Products and Ziraat Bank. With
this new structure, Migros-Tu¨rk became a quasi-state-owned enterprise.
According to plans in the late 1960s, the eventual aim was to turn Migros-
Turk into a quasi-cooperative on the Swiss model (Hollander, 1970). This
never happened, however. Retail stores began to operate in 1958 and they
soon becamemore profitable than truck sales, accounting for over 60 per cent
of total sales by 1967. The shift away from mobile retailing and small
‘barrack-type’ stands took Migros-Tu¨rk into more prosperous middle-class
neighbourhoods. A buying office was set up in Mersin, in Turkey’s southern
agricultural heartland, and the company also entered into food processing
in a minor way. Gradually direct purchases increased, from 18 per cent in
1961 to 59 per cent in 1967. Earnings increased in the late 1960s, closing the
deficit gap.
Migros-Tu¨rk was initially opposed by small retailers and convenience
stores, but most of these small retailers managed to retain their business, as
supermarket penetration was slow with sales directed mainly to middle-class
urbanites. In any event, the urban middle classes continued to patronise the
periodic bazaars and other small retailers. This behaviour fits well with
generalisations of customers in developing countries, described by Saeed
Samiee (1993) as being characterised by: people buying smaller quantities,
with frequent visits to small shops in their neighbourhood; customer requir-
ing a large variety of products with minimal packaging; small retailers offer-
ing credit to their regular customers; and shopping functioning as an
important form of social interaction. Ugur Yavas¸, Erdener Kaynak and Eser
Borak (1981) point out that shopkeepers would extend credit only to the
191 The Swiss Migros hybrid, Migros-Tu¨rk
//FS2/CUP/3-PAGINATION/MRM/2-PROOFS/3B2/9780521861519C07.3D 192 [181–206] 19.9.2007 9:39PM
customers whom they know; non-supermarket shoppers therefore see this as
an important factor in their relations with the retailer.
By the end of the 1960s Swiss Migros was operating seventeen stores and
thirty-five sales trucks. When Hollander studied Migros-Tu¨rk, he saw a
positive picture:
Approximately thirteen or fourteen years of arduous efforts are really just beginning
to bear fruit, and Migros-Tu¨rk is just beginning to be viable, a more self-reliant
economic force. In the process it has become considerably more of a middle-class
institution than was envisaged at the start of the venture. Its experience accords with
the general rule that so-calledWestern ormodern retailing techniques are most easily
introduced in the middle- and upper income sectors of the developing economies.
(1970: 87–8)
The Turkish urban middle classes were growing, but only slowly. Import
substitution policies were bearing fruit in terms of industrialisation and the
domestic production of foodstuffs. The first Turkish-made automobile, the
Anadol, came out in 1967. The economy was heating up again, however, with
inflation on the rise once more. Anti-American student demonstrations in
1968 were a landmark event in the intensifying political crisis, which even-
tually led to a military coup in March 1971. Migros-Tu¨rk’s sales declined
again during this period, in line with the deepening economic crisis.
The search for modern retailing and marketing
in scarcity and turbulence
The 1970s were bloody and turbulent. Turkey might have been defending
NATO’s borders against the Soviet Union but the American dream never
materialised. Despite heavy foreign borrowing industrialisation was slow,
and the economy suffered periodic setbacks. Ideological divisions sharpened.
Many intellectuals and students who supported leftist ideologies were against
the exploitation of capitalist enterprises, while the ultra-nationalists and
traditionalists were united in defiance of the subversive values of commun-
ism. From 1974 onwards there were street clashes between left- and right-
wing youth groups across the country. Businesses did not escape the effects
of the conflict, as industrial disputes and attacks exacerbated the crisis.
Ever since the mid-1960s domestic production and investments had been
dependent upon imports, for which there were limited financial resources.
Coupled with the first and second oil shocks of the 1970s, inflation soared
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and remained high, and the economy went into a deep recession marked by
severe shortages of goods, high unemployment and business closures. Turkey
had to rely on workers’ remittances from Europe for its foreign currency.
The scarcity of food and a rise in black market trade created shortages of
basic foodstuffs in all major cities. State control brought inflexibility and
further fuelled the black market. Retailers and wholesalers were accused of
making unlawful profits. SwissMigros was determined this time that it would
pull out of the Turkish market. Rudolf Suter, a board member of Migros-
Tu¨rk for the period of 1962–76, expressed the parent company’s frustrations
with the political and economic instability in the country, identifying the
price controls imposed by the state as the most important difficulty Migros-
Tu¨rk faced, and arguing that the business could not be maintained with this
imposed price regime while inflation and costs were rising. Swiss Migros
considered selling its shares to a cooperative, but there was no buyer. The
government was worried about market disruptions and urged Swiss Migros
not to harm the consumers in such hard times. Suter approached several of
Turkey’s largest businessmen, among them Vehbi Koc¸, the founder of the
Koc¸ family conglomerate, which was then beginning to invest in food proces-
sing and had just opened TAT, a canned food factory. Koc¸ had risen in
business from trade and once owned a small convenience store himself.
This background is believed to have played a role in his decision to buy
Migros-Tu¨rk despite the turbulent economic and political environment.
A new beginning was engineered when Migros-Tu¨rk Limited was finally
established, on 13 January 1975, the name being retained after an agreement
had been reached with Swiss Migros. At that date the company was still only
an Istanbul-based retailer, with sixteen stores, thirty-two trucks and 707
employees. Most of the equipment andmerchandise was old and the facilities
were in a dire condition. First the Koc¸ family raised the capital from TL9
million to TL50 million. Then they brought several young and successful
managers, who ended up staying with the company for decades. The most
influential of those were Oktay Irsidar and Hulki Halisbah, who gave long
service as board members and helped to establish business networks and a
solid supply chain. The new Migros-Tu¨rk endured more than a decade of
slow growth while it upgraded its facilities. Indeed, no significant technology
upgrading took place until 1990, and its first store outside Istanbul, in Izmir,
Turkey’s third largest city, was opened only in 1988, thirteen years after Koc¸
had acquired the major stake in the company. By this time Migros-Tu¨rk was
no longer a pacesetter inmodern retailing, and the Koc¸ family preferred to see
the company ‘hibernate’, maintaining only the existing routines.
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In the light of the economic crisis of the 1970s, both the government and
marketing experts argued that large supermarkets and cooperatives could
resolve price increases and food shortages. The main debate concentrated on
whether Turkey was ready for large modern stores (Oksay, 1979; Koparal,
1988). Scholars were also debating these issues in connection with developing
countries (Goldman, 1981, 1982). The growing private sector was not inter-
ested in large-scale retailing, however. Consequently, the second generation
of supermarkets were developed as consumer cooperatives and in conjunc-
tion with local governments in order to cope with price increases and to
provide a regular supply of foodstuffs. Local governments played a parti-
cularly significant role in establishing supermarkets and special stores known
as Tanzim Satis¸, which emerged with municipal management in the major
cities. Local governments also intervened in food distribution channels and
tried to crowd out middlemen in the distribution channel. Not many of these
stores thrived, however. Tansas¸, an enterprise of themunicipality of Izmir, set
up in 1973, did succeed adapting supermarket technology in the 1980s and
further expanding its business during the 1990s. Gima also prospered, as did
the Ordu Pazarlari, a supermarket chain, which was established for members
of the Turkish armed forces.
The cloning of Migros-Tu¨rk with market liberalisation
The 1980 military coup stopped the bloodshed of the 1970s and initiated
economic liberalisation, but it narrowed the scope for democracy. The first
elected government did not take power till 1983, led by Turgut O¨zal, an
admirer and friend of the United Kingdom’s prime minister, Margaret
Thatcher, and the United States president, Ronald Reagan. He quickly
began deregulating the closed economy, following IMF and World Bank
prescriptions. Starting from the mid-1980s government policies aimed to
reduce the direct role of the state in the economy through deregulation, and
the privatisation of state-owned food-processing enterprises came into effect
in 1987. The minor share held by state banks in Migros-Tu¨rk was sold to the
Koc¸ family. Koc¸ opened four new stores in Izmir in 1988 and began assessing
the future of the business in light of the more competitive environment.
Urban incomes were rising, along with car ownership, which increased
twentyfold between 1970 and 1990 (see http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/ekonomi/
gosterge/tr/1950-04/esg.htm). The same year the first modern shopping mall,
Galleria, opened in Istanbul, with the French store Printemps as its anchor.
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Metro, the German cash and carry store, entered the Turkish market in 1990,
followed by France’s Carrefour in 1991. The French Prusinic and Istanbul
municipality opened Turkey’s biggest supermarket, Belpa, in Merter, a
working-class district of Istanbul, in 1991 (Aydin, 1992). These were followed
by other European retailers (O¨zcan, 2001). The liberalisation policies aimed
at changing the outlook for the Turkish economy, thereby influencing society
as a whole. Copying Western-style retailing and shopping malls was seen as a
visible symbol of this change. Thus, the government actively encouraged
modernisation through incentives to large domestic and international retai-
lers (Tokatli and O¨zcan, 1998).
Although official moves to effect a policy change from import substitution
to liberal economic development took place in the early 1980s, the real impact
of the liberal trade regime began to make itself felt only in the 1990s. The
customs union agreements with the European Union in 1995 marked the
single most important development in reducing trade barriers and elimi-
nating the state protection that had previously been extended to domestic
businesses, with high tariffs and exemptions. The flow of foreign direct
investment into Turkey was persistently small compared with that into east-
ern Europe, but remaining within the range of $1 to 2 billion until 2003 (see
http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/ekonomi/gosterge/tr/1950-04/esg.htm), the large retai-
ling sector proved to be the most attractive one for European investors. At a
time when their home markets were becoming saturated and planning
restrictions for new urban location were tightening, many large retailers
were looking for international expansion. Successful applications of IT
made large-scale retailing more efficient and profitable. Early comers were
French and German investors, followed by Dutch, Belgian and American
firms. The 1990s witnessed many activities and consolidation efforts. Despite
their early entry, French retailers – with the exception of Carrefour – have not
been successful in Turkey.
For the first time large conglomerates and banks took an interest in
retailing, attracted by the advantages of daily cash generation and customer
data. Bank-owning conglomerates, such as Fiba Holding and the Dogus¸
group, acquired Gima and Tansas¸, respectively (O¨zcan, 2000). Credit buying
allowed suppliers to be used as surrogate banks by retailers, with credit
purchases consisting of a significant share of the stock. (This is a general
phenomenon as large retailers gain a powerful position in the market vis-a`-
vis manufacturers and suppliers, (see Plender, Simons and Tricks, 2005.)
More importantly, with this credit advantage, the daily cash generated in
retailing was dumped into ‘hot money’ markets with high interest rates. With
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inflation running at around 60 to 80 per cent, short-term interest rates
reached 100 per cent and higher. Anecdotal evidence reveals that many
large retailers invested their cash in this money market. Land development
and speculation generated further benefits to those, such as Carrefour, that
were able to purchase large areas and develop new shopping space to rent or
sell. These alternative capital-generating techniques became widespread
among domestic retailers as well.
After more than a decade of hesitation the Koc¸ family decided to enter
large-scale retailing and update its retail technology. From 1990 onwards
Migros-Tu¨rk began imitating European retailers in using state-of-the-art-
technology. The technology and marketing aspects of supermarket and
hypermarket retailing were carefully studied and American consultants
were hired. The Koc¸ family was ready to pour in resources in order to make
this cloning work but, more importantly, they retained the valued ‘old
guards’ while making room for new ideas and managers. This organisational
transformation facilitated the use and absorption of new retail technologies.
The newly appointed chairman of Migros-Tu¨rk, Bu¨lent O¨zaydinli, came
up with a ten-year plan. The old guard managers were suspicious of the big
expansion and, later, even became opposed to internationalisation efforts.
Nevertheless, the new chairman and new managers were able to persuade the
board members and the Koc¸ directors. A group of young and well-educated
university graduates was hired and many stayed on and grew in stature with
the business. The top universities were the main source of new ideas and
management techniques in the country, and these young managers were
ready to absorb the new retail technology. The transforming retailing busi-
ness fitted well with their expectations for modernisation in Turkey as well.
The ideological confrontations of the 1960s and 1970s had been marginalised
by the 1990s. Migros-Tu¨rk was able to recruit from the growing pool of
young graduates in the fields of marketing, economics and IT studies.
O¨zaydinli secured the success of the business by cultivating the loyalty and
ability of middle managers and professionals. Their response was positive,
and many devoted their work to the domestic and international success of
the company. Throughout our interviews these managers stressed their pride
in the speed of the expansion. As one said, ‘We were growing so quickly, for
a while opening one store per week, it became extremely exciting and
challenging’ (interview with Kerim Tatlici, manager, July 2005).
In 1991 the store format was updated on similar lines to those of Swiss
Migros, although there were no formal business links. Around the same time
the first Gulf War began and Turkey agreed to join the coalition forces led by
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the United States and the United Kingdom. The war ruined the economy of
south-eastern Turkey, as trade and oil pipeline revenues were lost. Kurdish
separatists’ guerrilla training camps operated from northern Iraq and further
destabilised the situation. The increased political insecurity also slowed down
the aggressive pursuit of European retailers. Migros-Tu¨rk was accustomed to
the bumpy nature of the Turkish economy and politics, however, and usually
enjoyed good relations with political parties as an affiliate of Koc¸, then the
biggest Turkish conglomerate. With this confidence and market understand-
ing, it was able to make a major leap forward at a time when other large
international retailers were busy consolidating their entry gains in Istanbul.
The technology acquisition and in-house software development were suc-
cessful; the new store format was working; and customers were enthusiastic.
Secure in this knowledge, the company developed a goal of opening two
stores per week in 1996.
The survival of a hybrid through technology absorption
and internationalisation
Other momentous political events were taking place during this period as
well. In 1989 the eastern bloc began to crumble, and in 1991 the Soviet Union
was dismantled. This was both a big ideological shock and an unexpected
economic opportunity for Turkey. The motto of the 1970s – ‘Communists to
Moscow!’ – was quickly buried in the public psyche. Trade, tourism and
business links grew rapidly between Russia and Turkey. Economic and
cultural ties with the formerly little-known central Asian Turkic-speaking
states also grew. Turkish construction companies, which were successful in
the Middle East and north Africa, were among the first to enter the Russian
market. They gained a good reputation and developed an understanding of
and links with the political elite and bureaucracy there. Thousands of shuttle
traders from CIS countries flocked to the northern Black Sea towns of
Trabzon and Rize, and Istanbul’s Laleli district became a major hub for
shuttle traders from eastern Europe, Russia and central Asia in the 1990s
(Yu¨kseker, 2003). Turkish entrepreneurs began seeking business fortunes in
central Asia and Russia, leading to the establishment of many Turkish-owned
companies. Economic and political reforms linked to the European Union
accession talks and political consolidation led to further positive develop-
ments. The rate of inflation finally came down to a single-digit figure in 2003,
after twenty years when rates had averaged some 60 per cent. Business
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confidence increased, with exports, mainly industrial, and tourism revenues
soaring from 2000 onwards.
The Turkish retail market continues to offer enormous room for the entry of
large retailers: the top three retailers’ market share is only 12 per cent, com-
pared to 57 per cent in Germany and 64 per cent in France. Despite the fact that
the growth of GDP had taken the per capita figure past the $5,000 level,
however, intraregional and urban inequalities remained major problems,
with a widening skill gap and poor public services in many cities and rural
areas. Nonetheless, the affluence of the urban middle classes continued to
increase. Credit sales soared as the number of bank credit cards jumped from
766,000 in 1991 to 14million in 2001. The resistance of small retailers and their
associations to the spread of big retail chains and shopping malls has recently
led to the drafting of new laws on opening hours and planning restrictions,
similar to the comparable attempts by small retailers in western Europe. There
has been further consolation in the sector with the sale of Tansas¸, Gima and
Kipa, Migros-Tu¨rk’s respons being the acquisition of 78.1 per cent of
the shares of Tansas¸4. This acquisition brought another 206 stores, in several
regions of Turkey, and some 5,000 more employees to the company.
Opening up the domestic market to international competition made con-
glomerates such as Koc¸ realise the need for technology and business upgrad-
ing. Many large and medium-sized family conglomerates that had grown
behind the protective walls of the import substitution policies began seeking
new opportunities through internationalisation. The Koc¸ business group
succeeded in building its home appliance brands, such as Beko, in the UK
market. O¨zaydinli and his managers also recognised the potential of the CIS
and Russian markets and needed to build friendly relations based on mutual
interest, but Russia was unknown to them. The solution was found with a
business synergy with the large construction company Enka, which had a
good business record in Russia.5 Thus, while large TNCs such as Tesco were
securing their position in the eastern European market, Migros-Tu¨rk made
the strategic decision to expand principally in Russia and central Asia.
In many ways this was a wise decision, as it was almost impossible for an
emerging Turkish retailer to enter the Europeanmarket. In Russia and central
Asia, however, Migros-Tu¨rk’s stores have become the symbol of modern
retailing: and shopping malls in 2006 the company had three stores in
Azerbaijan, ten shopping malls and forty-nine stores in Russia and two
shopping malls and five stores in Kazakhstan; it also had stores in Bulgaria
and one store and a hypermarket in Macedonia. The first test case of inter-
national expansion came in Baku, as Azerbaijan was culturally and physically
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closest to Turkey, and this was followed by investments in Russia and
Kazakhstan, and, in the Balkans, Bulgaria and Macedonia, making Migros-
Tu¨rk an international retailer in less than ten years.With the Ramstore brand,
Migros entered the Russian market during the economic crisis in 1998. The
managers’ belief in the future of the Russian economy and its ability to
bounce back made them friends in Kremlin. Ramstores were welcomed by
Russian politicians and consumers at a time when Russia was not an attrac-
tive market for large Western retailers and there were still food shortages.
While aggressively pursuing international market opportunities, Migros-
Tu¨rk has moved to occupy the whole extent of the retail accordion in the
market with a range of small and large outlets, small discount stores for
low-income families, cooperation with small shop keepers, internet shopping
and a wholesaler business. With its range of retail formats the company
captures the lower and upper ends of urban sprawl, competing directly
with small convenience stores and wholesalers as well as large European
retailers. Internationalisation has changed the financial structure of Migros-
Tu¨rk as well: 51 per cent of shares are now owned by Koc¸ and the rest is traded
on the Istanbul Stock Exchange, 80 per cent of which is owned by foreign
investors. Formerly the company was self-reliant and used mainly the finan-
cial resources of the holding group, but this also changed as it began using
external funding, including an International Finance Corporation loan for
$60 million to further its expansion in Moscow in 2002 (see www.ifc.org).
Over the last ten years or so the company has expanded its technological
capabilities in retaining, restoring and using data. While European retailers
were slow in bringing their state-of-the-art IT applications to the Turkish
market, Migros-Tu¨rk became the pacesetter in the use of retail technologies
such as bar codes, electronic labelling, virtual marketing, electronic self-
service and business-to-business applications, although the financial crisis
in 2001 did slow some of the technology applications. Standard NCR (the
National Cash Register Company)6 technologies were used, but almost all the
company software represents in-house production adapted to the needs and
priorities of the company. Along with business growth, information techno-
logies were employed more aggressively and imaginatively to rationalise and
standardise the business processes and transactions; an IT master plan was
prepared in the late 1990s. Due to supply chain problems and production
faults the company was encountering large losses every day, and this is still
a common problem for retailers in Turkey. The business-to-business appli-
cations aimed to rationalise the supply chain, they succeeded in moving the
supplier receipt and ordering process to internet speed.
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All the stores are now electronically linked to each other, and also to more
than 70 per cent of the 635 supplier companies, and this increases efficiency
of shelf and stock control. The 2.5 million receipts that are, on average,
processed each year are now dealt with electronically, offering enormous
time and cost advantages. The introduction of IT has aided efficient delivery
and stock control, and the improved distribution network for suppliers has
enhanced organisational capabilities – and profits. By setting up a wholesale
business and internet site, Migros-Tu¨rk is attempting to shape its business
relations with suppliers, producers and customers. This combined with the
penetration of IT-aided business practices in transactions, is changing the
business culture and attitudes in retailing and wholesaling. Kangurum.com,
initiated in 1998, provides internet shopping facilities, with 75,000 goods
from over sixty stores, and marked another first in Turkish retailing. The
loyalty card scheme,Migros Club Card, began in 1998 and reached 4.5million
customers by 2005, and the targeted marketing has become more sophisti-
cated and speedy.
The success of technology use was achieved through enhanced organisa-
tional capabilities. A new human resources and employment policy was put
in place in 1990 with the appoinment of young and dynamic managers to
responsible positions. The number of female managers and employees also
increased. This long-term dedication and ability to integrate young and
ambitious professionals and managers seem to be the key to the success of
the retail technology adaptation by Migros-Tu¨rk. With long-term mutual
commitment by staff and firm, the organisational knowledge and capabilities
generated in the lower and higher echelons of the management team has
remained within the company. The company claims a continuing interest in
the training and skills development of its workforce. A retail management
institute was opened in 2000 at Koc¸ University to give executive training and
courses to managers and professionals about new retail technologies and
trends. Members of staff were regularly sent abroad tomake observations and
attend conferences and trade fairs, further instilling loyalty. The speed of the
business, its range of activities and the complexity of its market analysis
techniques excite many of those involved.
Analysis and conclusions
The success of Migros-Tu¨rk cannot simply be explained by its first-mover
advantages. Nor is it a story of continuous institutional evolution. Migros’s
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growth trajectory saw it evolve into a hybrid form that became neither a Swiss
business nor simply a mirror of a typical Turkish conglomerate. What this
shows is that these hybrid organisations can emerge through business and
technology transplantations, and if they can take advantage of internationali-
sation they can even be pacesetters in other markets for business development
and technology transfer. Nevertheless, the case of Migros also shows that the
process of hybridisation requires decades of organisational deployment,
periodic hibernation and a determined and reliable source of capital if it is
to succeed against a backdrop of market competition, state intervention and
political and social volatility.
Migros-Tu¨rk had a rocky existence until the 1990s. Its organisational
development stalled in the 1970s and the 1980s, when it was caught up by
local chains, such as Gima and Tansas¸. It was not Migros-Tu¨rk that took
the first IT-monitored supermarket technology to Turkey. Turkey’s first
and biggest supermarket emerged from a partnership between the muni-
cipality of Istanbul and its French partner in 1991, but this enterprise failed
within a few years. As in the 1950s and the 1970s, municipalities and
government intervention changed the market circumstances and competi-
tive pressures.
After more than a decade of passive survival, Migros began to import
cutting-edge technology as part of its new vision in the 1990s. While retail
technology has been available to other domestic firms and was also success-
fully disseminated through the regional chains, only a few players were able
to generate their own organisational capability to grow and compete inter-
nationally. There are several reasons for this. First, the Koc¸ Group was
committed to its push for growth. Compared to large conglomerates such
as the Dogus¸ Group, which acquired retail chains but failed to manage and
expand them, Koc¸ was able to retain the business ware, expertise and
organisational capability of Migros-Tu¨rk. It valued its old guard while
bringing in new blood. Second, unlike other provincial rivals such as
Begendik and Yimpas, it enjoyed a much bigger pool of managerial and
financial assets and traded on its established reputation. Koc¸’s name helped
Migros-Tu¨rk to recruit top professionals and exploit synergies with busi-
nesses such as Enka, a major construction group, and other suppliers. Third,
the vision the general manager, Bu¨lent O¨zaydinli, was supported by the
managers of the Koc¸ group throughout the 1990s. Finally, the technology
adaptation was managed successfully by an able, young and highly moti-
vated workforce, and achieved through an ability to build a new organisation
while growing very rapidly.
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The growth of Turkish Migros since 1990 has been remarkable. The
company now operates in 853 stores (including seventy-three Ramstores
abroad), reaches 218 million people in five countries and employs more
than 10,000 people. A comparison of Migros-Tu¨rk with several global retai-
lers puts its achievements in perspective, however. The total turnover of all
large retailers in Turkey was estimated to be around e3 billion in 2005,
whereas large European retailers active in Turkey, such as Carrefour and
Metro, each had over e60 billion turnover from their global operations. In
2005 the annual sales of Migros-Tu¨rk were just e1.2 billion. Europe’s big
retailers have been growing aggressively and penetrating world markets over
the past two decades through mergers and acquisitions, not by organic
growth. In 2004 the leading European retailer, Carrefour, achieved more
than e90 billion in sales in more than thirty countries, with most sales in its
home market, France. The second largest, Metro, made e64.1 billion sales
through its 2,400 stores in twenty-nine countries, with somewhat less reliance
on its home market, Germany (see www.foodanddrinkeurope.com/news/).
Another comparison with Swiss Migros also reveals interesting results.
After years of hesitation and the unsuccessful acquisition of a local chain in
Austria, Swiss Migros chose to remain a mainly Swiss cooperative business.
Internationally insignificant and fully entrenched in its homemarket, in 1991
the Swiss Migros assembly of delegates voted for international expansion,
first into France. French people who worked in Switzerland and lived near the
Swiss border were considered natural potential customers. A similar expan-
sion strategy was applied to Germany. Interestingly, while Migros-Tu¨rk was
discovering totally different markets, such as Russia, Swiss Migros was con-
cerned with retaining its product range and principles in bordering coun-
tries7. International expansion has not been the main objective of the
cooperative and it continued to consolidate its conservative home market.
As a result of its successful operations in the small but wealthy Swiss market,
unhindered by foreign competition, Swiss Migros has been able to develop
stable market relations over the years. More than a half of Swiss households,
some 1.9 million people, held Migros shares in 2004. By that year Swiss
Migros was one of the country’s top twenty enterprises, employing around
81,000 people (Ulrich, 2005). The turnover of Swiss Migros was e13 billion,
with 1,292 stores in just three countries.
The trajectory and size of Swiss Migros clearly illustrates the modesty of
Turkish Migros’s achievements, and the main difference appears to be not in
the organisational capabilities or strategic vision but in other respects.
The first is the nature of and the difference between the home markets.
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Migros-Tu¨rk has been operating in a low per capita income environment in a
large country in which spending power has been at least five to six times lower
than in Switzerland. Political and regional volatility generated further busi-
ness uncertainty and hindered long-term business growth. Second, capital
accumulation in the hands of domestic family conglomerates such as Koc¸,
despite their close ties with the ruling political parties, has been slow in
Turkey. This is partly due to the fact that, until the 1980s, many were
operating in a closed economy with almost no potential for international
expansion. This is why Turkish conglomerates were latecomers to interna-
tionalise, had low levels of capital accumulation and limited local market
growth. Finally, the modern management practices and skilled manpower
needed to steer large operations emerged only after the 1980s.
Notes
This chapter is dedicated to the memory of a good colleague and friend, Colin Simmons,
formerly Professor of Economics at Salford University. I am very grateful to Messrs Kerim
Tatlici and Atilla O¨vu¨ndu¨r of Migros-Tu¨rk and Ms Yasemin Kuytak for their help.
1. Although the registered name of the company is Migros-Tu¨rk, ‘Migros’ is also commonly
used. In this chapter, unless stated as ‘Swiss Migros’, ‘Migros’ is used interchangeably for
‘Migros-Tu¨rk’.
2. The Commonwealth of Independent States emerged after the dismantling of the Soviet
Union. The CIS countries are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and
Uzbekistan.
3. EPOS is defined as the collection in real time at the point of sale, and the storing in a computer
file, of sales and other related data by means of a number of electronic devices (Lynch, 1990).
Electronic fund transfer (EFT) units attached to EPOS allow the automatic debiting of funds
from customers’ bank accounts for their purchase (Al-Sudairy and Tang, 2000).
4. Tansas was established in 1973 by the Izmir municipality to provide affordable meat and
coal to urban residents. In 1993 32.98 per cent of the shares were sold to the public.
Subsequently the majority stake passed to the Dogus Holding Group, and it merged with
Macrocenter of Dogus in 2002.
5. Ramstores are operated by Ramenka, incorporated in the Russian Federation in 1997.
Migros, Enka and Entrade currently own 50 per cent, 38 per cent and 12 per cent of
Ramenka, respectively (see www.ifc.org).
6. John H. Patterson founded the National Cash Register Company, maker of the first
mechanical cash registers in 1884, and since the 1950s the company has evolved to become
a leading technology provider for retailers (see www.ncr.com/en/history/history.htm).
7. The conservatism I refer to here is in a business strategy sense, and is not linked to Swiss
Migros’s principle of not selling alcohol, tobacco, war toys or pornographic material.
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